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Guessing versus Choosing an
Upcoming Task
Thomas Kleinsorge* and Juliane Scheil
Leibniz Research Centre for Working Environment and Human Factors, Dortmund, Germany
We compared the effects of guessing vs. choosing an upcoming task. In a task-
switching paradigm with four tasks, two groups of participants were asked to either
guess or choose which task will be presented next under otherwise identical conditions.
The upcoming task corresponded to participants’ guesses or choices in 75 % of the
trials. However, only participants in the Choosing condition were correctly informed
about this, whereas participants in the Guessing condition were told that tasks were
determined at random. In the Guessing condition, we replicated previous findings of
a pronounced reduction of switch costs in case of incorrect guesses. This switch
cost reduction was considerably less pronounced with denied choices in the Choosing
condition. We suggest that in the Choosing condition, the signaling of prediction errors
associated with denied choices is attenuated because a certain proportion of denied
choices is consistent with the overall representation of the situation as conveyed by task
instructions. In the Guessing condition, in contrast, the mismatch of guessed and actual
task is resolved solely on the level of individual trials by strengthening the representation
of the actual task.
Keywords: task switching, cognitive control, prediction, prediction error, predictive coding
INTRODUCTION
The human brain is an intrinsically predictive device. Predictive processes pervade probably
all areas of cognition, ranging from short-term phenomena as perceiving a certain object in a
particular position or reaching toward such an object to long-term decisions like planning a career
or choosing a mate to share (at least large parts of) one’s life with (cf. Bubic et al., 2010, for a review).
Although notions of predictive processing can be found already in the writings of nineteenth
century pioneers of psychology and neuroscience such as James and von Helmholtz, there is also
a strong tradition within psychology, dating back to the days of behaviorism and being rooted in
Cartesian conceptions of the mind, which construes behavior as being essentially stimulus-driven
and reactive. And while the concept of a predictive brain has received overwhelming empirical
support during the past decade, the legacy of behaviorism still lurks through many paradigms
employed in experimental psychology as external stimulation is considered as the trigger for
cognitive processes. This situation engenders the danger of mistakenly transferring the temporal
structure of psychological experiments to the cognitive processes underlying the performance of
an experimental task (cf. Kunde et al., 2007).
Correct predictions convey obvious adaptive benefits as they shorten the time needed for
perceiving an expected stimulus and allow for preparing appropriate actions (LaBerge, 1995). Less
obvious is the flipside of this, namely the consequences incurred by incorrect predictions. In the
attentional domain, costs incurred by incorrect predictions (usually induced by misleading cues)
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are pervasive (Posner, 1980), as are costs associated with ‘re-
programming’ a movement in the motor domain (Rosenbaum,
1985). However, whereas it may be considered as obvious (or
even trivial) that correctly predicting that a particular event
will occur conveys benefits as compared to a situation in
which the prediction of an event is followed by the occurrence
of another, unpredicted event, this obviousness may in part
result from mistakenly transferring temporal structure from
an experimental situation to inferred temporal structure of
underlying cognitive and neural processes (cf. Mars et al.,
2007). Predictions are usually embedded in overarching action
plans so that costs on a lower level may convey benefits on a
higher level by allowing for a fine-tuning of actions to actual
demands. Furthermore, while a mismatch of predictions and
reality may disrupt ongoing information processing and action,
it subsequently promotes learning and other adaptations serving
to enhance the efficiency of future behavior (cf. Bubic et al.,
2010). A large body of evidence suggests that a key function
of prediction errors is to induce hierarchically higher levels of
information processing to adapt their predictions regarding the
state of the world as conveyed by hierarchically lower levels, thus
refining a model of the causal structure of the world by iteratively
reducing the prediction error (cf. den Ouden et al., 2012; Clark,
2013).
In a recent study in the realm of task switching, we
(Kleinsorge and Scheil, 2015) asked participants to predict the
identity of the upcoming task (Experiments 1 and 2). Since the
actual task was determined quasi-randomly, participants had
to resort to guessing in order to meet the task requirements.
We hypothesized that a mismatch of predictions with the
actually presented task results in an additional recruitment
of cognitive control processes, which in turn should facilitate
task switches more than task repetitions. As a consequence,
switch costs, i.e., an increase in reaction times (RTs) and
error rates (ERs) in task switch trials as compared to task
repetition trials, should be less pronounced after an incorrect
as compared to a correct guess of the upcoming task. The
latter prediction was borne out by the data. However, this
finding was mainly due to an increase of task-repetition
RTs following an incorrect guess. We accounted for these
observations by assuming that incorrect guesses would generally
interrupt ongoing information processing but that in task switch
trials, this would be offset by a transient boost of cognitive
control selectively facilitating task switches. When, in a third
experiment, participants were asked to guess the position of the
next precue instead of the identity of the next task, we observed
a selective facilitation of task switches in case of an incorrect
guess. A similar finding had been reported by Duthoo et al.
(2012).
In the present study, we replicated the basic procedure
of Experiment 2 of Kleinsorge and Scheil (2015) with the
addition of another, newly designed Choosing condition. The two
conditions, Guessing and Choosing, were strictly identical with
the exception of the instructions given to participants. Therefore,
any performance differences between these two conditions could
not be due to differences in stimuli, responses, or the tasks and
their sequence. Importantly, both conditions differed from the
original experiment of Kleinsorge and Scheil (2015) in that the
upcoming task conformed to participants’ guesses or choices in
75 percent of the trials. Whereas participants in the Choosing
condition were correctly informed about this, participants in
the Guessing conditions were told that the upcoming task
was determined independently of their guessing response. The
rationale of the experiment hinged on the expectation that this
change would not affect participants performance as evidenced
by a replication of the interaction of the ‘correctness’ of the
guessing response and the task sequence, that is, whether the task
repeated or switched. Fortunately, our observations conformed
to this expectation (see below). The proportion of 75% of
trials conforming to participants’ guesses or choices was chosen
because we anticipated that this proportion would lend sufficient
credibility to both instructions. Increasing the number of ‘correct
guesses’ would have made it increasingly likely that participants
experience control over the presented task, whereas decreasing
the number of fulfilled choices would have counteracted the
experience of control that is essential for an experience of
‘choice.’
Of course, the Guessing and Choosing conditions differed
not only with respect to what participants were instructed
to do (to guess vs. to choose) but also with respect to the
amount and validity of information provided to them. We
consider these differences not as a confound but as corollaries
of the different mental states associated with guessing and
choosing: ‘to guess’ means that one experiences no control over
a situation (even if one in fact may have some), whereas to
choose is intrinsically associated with experiencing at least some
control (even if one may actually have none). Nevertheless,
this implies some ambiguity with respect to attributing eventual
differences between conditions to different instructions and
different amounts of information provided to participants.
As far as we can see, there is little current knowledge
for guiding specific hypotheses regarding functional differences
between guessing and choosing under otherwise strictly identical
conditions. Bode et al. (2013) reported a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) study in which participants were asked
to guess or decide (choose) among object categories without
any perceptual information supporting their guesses or choices.
Based on a fMRI-based pattern classifier, they were able to
cross-predict choices from decisions and vice versa. The authors
interpreted their findings as indicating that (perceptual) guesses
and decisions were partly based on the same neural mechanisms,
which they located mainly in the mid-precuneus, a structure
located in medial parietal cortex that is assumed to be involved
in self-related processing and the experience of agency (Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006).
While, as shown in our previous study (Kleinsorge and Scheil,
2015), incorrect guesses of an upcoming task certainly result
in some kind of adaptation, there is no information available
to participants allowing for an enhancement of the accuracy
of future guesses. At the same time, the uncertainty inherent
in the unpredictability of the environment should motivate
the cognitive system to ‘try harder’ in order to attain some
control over the situation. In the Choosing condition of the
present study, in contrast, participants were veridically informed
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about the underlying probabilities. This provided participants
with an internal representation or model of the situation which
could be compared to the actually experienced frequencies of
granted and denied choices. Because these frequencies should
match the internal model based on instructions, granted as
well as denied choices may corroborate rather than challenge
participants’ current model of the situation without any need for
adjustments on a higher level. From this perspective, one may
expect that while denied choices should result in some delay
of responding due to the necessity to update the representation
of task identity, they should not induce any adaptations that
affect task repetitions and switches differently. Observing such
a difference between the Guessing and the Choosing conditions
would result in two advances. First, it would corroborate our
assumption that what we observed in our previous study
(and sought to replicate in the Guessing condition of the
present study) was not due to any confounds related to the
task sequence such as different probabilities of task repetitions
and task switches or disruptions of repetition-based facilitation
that affected incorrectly guessed task repetitions (cf. Kleinsorge
and Scheil, 2015, for a discussion) because all these factors
should affect the Guessing and Choosing conditions in the
same way. Second, it would provide conclusive evidence that
incorrect guesses indeed trigger a top-down process of cognitive
control.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-eight subjects (11 male) with a mean age of 23.8 years
(range: 20–29) participated. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. They were assigned to one of the two groups based
on an odd-even scheme. The study was approved by the local
ethics committee of the Leibniz Research Centre for Working
Environment and Human Factors. All participants gave their
written informed consent for study participation.
Stimuli, Tasks, and Apparatus
Imperative stimuli consisted of digits from range 1–9 (excluding
5) and the letters A, B, G, E, N, O, S, and U. Each digit was
about 7 mm high× 4 mm wide. Digits and letters were presented
side by side, their position was chosen randomly on every trial.
Task precues consisted of a dark blue square, diamond, circle,
or triangle surrounding the position of the imperative stimulus
with a size of about 15 cm × 15 cm. There were four tasks in
total, two of them regarding the digit and two regarding the letter.
The numerical judgment tasks either concerned the magnitude
(smaller vs. larger than five) or the parity of the digits. The
magnitude task was indicated by the diamond, the parity task
was indicated by the circle. The letters had to be judged regarding
their position in the alphabet (first or second half, indicated by
the triangle) or regarding whether it is a consonant or a vowel
(indicated by the square).
Stimuli were presented centrally on a 17′′ monitor in black on
light-gray background. Viewing distance was not controlled, but
equally given with approximately 60 cm. Responses were made
with the right hand by pressing the left arrow key for small and
even digits as well as for vowels and letters from the first half of
the alphabet. The right arrow key had to be pressed for large and
odd digits and for consonants and letters from the second half of
the alphabet.
Design and Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases. The first and third
phase were designed as the usual cuing-variant of the task
switching paradigm, with a task switching probability of 0.5.
During the second phase, participants determined the upcoming
task in 75% of the trials, whereas a different task was presented
in 25%. The only difference between the two groups were the
instructions they received at the beginning of the second phase,
whereas the experimental procedure was completely identical for
both groups.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were
provided with on-screen instructions in which the tasks and the
meaning of the task cues were explained. The first phase consisted
of three blocks of 96 trials. The response-stimulus interval (RSI)
was set to 1,100 ms in the first and third phase of the experiment
and to 3,100 ms during the second (prediction) phase. In case of
an error, error feedback was presented for additional 1,000 ms; in
case of RTs slower than the RT deadline of 2,500 ms, RT feedback
(‘too slow’) was presented for additional 1,000 ms. Two CTIs of
200 and 1,000 ms were employed during the whole experiment,
with the duration of the CTI being evenly and pseudo-randomly
distributed across all tasks.
At the beginning of the second phase, participants of the
two groups received different instructions. Participants of the
Choosing condition were informed that during this phase, they
could choose the upcoming task in every trial. This was done
by pressing one of four keys on a custom-built keyboard with
the left index finger. During the first 2,000 ms of the RSI,
a choosing request (‘Please choose now’) was presented on
the screen. Within this time, participants had to press one of
the choosing keys and to hold it down until the presentation
of the imperative stimulus. If the key was dropped earlier,
error feedback was presented and the trial was canceled. If the
choosing key was pressed after 2,000 ms, participants received
feedback (‘Too slow! Please choose faster’) until one of the
keys was pressed, but the trial was not canceled. Participants
were informed that in 75% of the trials, the specified task
would be presented (accepted choices), but in 25%, another
task would be presented at random (denied choices). They were
instructed to choose all tasks approximately equally often and
with a switching probability of 0.5. After choosing, the trial
continued as during the first phase: first, a fixation mark and
after that, the precue was presented. Fixation mark and precue
summed up to 1,100 ms, the CTIs being the same as in the
first phase. After that, the imperative stimulus was presented and
had to be judged regarding the task that was indicated by the
precue.
Participants of the Guessing group were told that the task
sequence during the next blocks would be completely random,
as it was in the first phase. They were instructed to guess on every
trial which task will have to be performed on next. The guessing
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procedure was identical to the choosing procedure, except for a
different wording of the guessing request (‘Please guess now’) and
the feedback for slow guesses (‘Too slow! Please guess faster’).
Participants were told that the task sequence was completely
random, that no regularity had to be ‘detected’ and that they were
expected to really guess the next task. In addition, they were told
that all tasks would occur with equal frequency and that switching
probability was 0.5. The second phase consisted of nine blocks of
96 trials each.
At the beginning of the third phase, participants were
informed that, as in phase 1, no choosing/guessing was required.
The third phase consisted of three blocks of 96 trials each.
RESULTS
The data were analyzed by two sets of analyses of variance. The
first set of analyses compared performance across all phases of the
experiment. In these analyses, the effect of the CTI was taken as an
indicator of preparation for a guessed or chosen task in advance
of the presentation of the task precue. In a second step, the data
from the second phase were analyzed separately. These analyses
focused on the effects of task expectation and its interaction with
the task sequence. Of special interest was the question inasmuch
a difference between choosing and guessing would be observed in
this respect.
Analyses across All Phases of the
Experiment
In a first step, mean individual RTs and ERs of all three
phases of the experiment were analyzed as a function of the
between-participants factor Condition (Guessing vs. Choosing)
and the within-participants factors Phase (first, second, third),
CTI (200 vs. 1,000 ms), and Task Transition (repetition vs.
switch). From the second phase, only trials with correct guesses
or granted choices were included into this analysis. The first
blocks of the first and second phase were considered as
practice and not included in the analyses. Trials in which
the RT deadline was missed (1.8%) and trials following an
error (9.8%) were also discarded, as were error trials from the
analysis of RTs (6.9%). Note that errors in post-error trials
were counted as post-error trials, which explains the higher
percentage of these trials relative to error trials. The main
aim of these analyses was to check inasmuch participants were
committed to their guesses or choices in the second phase.
Such a commitment should be indicated by a reduced effect
of the CTI in the second as compared to the first and third
phases of the experiment because participants could initiate
preparation for the guessed or chosen task already in advance
of the preparation of the task cue. Indeed, the reduction of
RT induced by a prolongation of the CTI amounted to 190
and 167 ms in the first and third phase, respectively, but
to only 105 ms in the second phase. This gave rise to a
significant interaction of Phase and CTI, F(2,72) = 14.16,
MSe = 5,148, p < 0.0001, on top of a main effect of CTI,
F(1,36) = 359.86, MSe = 7,373, p < 0.0001. The main effect
of Phase was also significant, F(2,72) = 69.28, MSe = 34,136,
p < 0.0001, due to a monotonic decrease of mean RT from
1,182 over 1,066 to 901 ms from the first to the third Phase.
Mean switch costs amounted to 192 ms, F(1,36) = 241.8,
MSe = 16,938, p < 0.0001. Switch costs were largest in the
first phase (304 ms), substantially declined in the second phase
(119 ms), and became larger again in the third phase (153 ms),
F(2,72) = 35.42, MSe = 10,223, p < 0.0001. Furthermore,
switch costs were reduced from 265 ms with the short CTI to
120 ms with the long CTI, F(1,36) = 148,54, MSe = 3,924,
p < 0.0001. This reduction of switch costs by a prolongation
of the CTI differed across the three phases, F(2,72) = 4.58,
MSe = 3,891, p < 0.05. In the first phase, switch costs were
reduced from 389 to 220 ms. In the second phase, switch costs
were reduced from 166 to 68 ms, and in the third phase,
the reduction was from 238 to 68 ms. The only significant
effect involving the between-participants factor Condition was
the second-order interaction of Condition, CTI, and Task
Transition, F(1,36) = 5.48, MSe = 3,924, p < 0.05. Whereas
the magnitude of switch costs was roughly the same with a
long CTI across the Guessing and Choosing conditions (118 vs.
121 ms), in the Choosing condition switch costs were smaller
(238 ms) than in the Guessing condition (291 ms) with a
short CTI.
The corresponding analysis of the ERs yielded a significant
main effect of Phase, F(2,72) = 55.86, MSe = 0.014, p < 0.0001,
with mean ER declining from 18% in the first phase to 5.1%
in the second phase and 4.6% in the third phase. There
was a main effect of CTI, F(1,36) = 11.88, MSe = 0.002,
p < 0.01, being due to a reduction of ER from 9.8% with a
short CTI to 8.4% with a long CTI. Mean error switch cost
amounted to 4.4%, F(1,36) = 81.96, MSe = 0.003, p < 0.0001.
The error switch cost declined across the three phases of the
experiment (9.6, 2.2, and 1.4%), F(2,72) = 34.41, MSe = 0.002,
p < 0.0001. The only effect involving the between-participants
factor Condition was the interaction of Condition and Phase,
F(2,72) = 3.23, MSe = 0.014, p < 0.05. In the Guessing
condition, ERs declined from 14.3 to 4.7 and 4.5% in the
first, second, and third phase. In the Choosing condition, the
corresponding numbers amounted to 21.0, 5.5, and 4.7%. As
the largest difference between the two conditions was observed
in the first phase in which there was no difference between
the Guessing and Choosing condition, the difference in ERs in
the first phase can be considered as spurious. Regarding the
seemingly steeper learning curve observed for the Choosing as
compared to the Guessing condition, one may consider the larger
amount of information provided in the Choosing condition
as a possible explanation. However, this observation may also
simply be due to uncontrolled between-participants variance.
In any case, it is important to note that accuracy levels were
comparable when our between-participants manipulation took
effect.
Analyses of the Second Phase
In the main analyses, individual mean RTs and ERs from
the second phase of the experiment were analyzed as a
function of the between-participants factor Condition (Guessing
vs. Choosing) and the within-participants factors CTI (200
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vs. 1,000 ms), Task Transition (repetition vs. switch), and
Expectation (expected vs. unexpected). The exact meaning of the
latter factor varied across conditions. In the Guessing condition,
‘expected’ means that the upcoming task corresponded to the
guess of the participant, whereas ‘unexpected’ means that the
actual task differed from the guessed one. In the Choosing
condition, ‘expected’ corresponds to granted choices, whereas
‘unexpected’ corresponds to denied choices. The first block
of the second phase was considered as practice and not
included in the analyses. Trials in which the RT deadline
was missed (0.4%) and trials following an error (8.7%) were
also discarded, as were error trials from the analysis of RTs
(6.2%).
The analysis of RTs (cf. Table 1) yielded significant main
effects of CTI, F(1,36) = 247.06, MSe = 9,592, Task Transition,
F(1,36)= 57.81, MSe= 10,203, and Expectation, F(1,36)= 46.28,
MSe= 11,641, all p’s< 0.0001. A prolongation of the CTI reduced
mean RT from 1101 to 922 ms. Task switches were associated with
longer RTs (1,056 ms) than task repetitions (967 ms). Expected
tasks went along with faster responses (969 ms) than unexpected
tasks (1,054 ms). A prolongation of the CTI reduced mean switch
costs from 119 ms to 60 ms, F(1,36) = 30.2, MSe = 2,166,
p< 0.0001. A prolongation of the CTI also reduced the difference
between expected and unexpected tasks from 159 to 11 ms,
F(1,36)= 115.03, MSe= 3,490, p< 0.0001.
Of central importance is the interaction of Task Transition and
Expectation, F(1,36) = 16.59, p < 0.001, and its modulation by
Condition, F(1,36) = 4.19, p < 0.05, MSe = 3,821. In case of
a task repetition, expected tasks went along with a mean RT of
909 ms, which was increased to 1,024 ms with an unexpected
task. In case of a task switch, the increase of RT by an unexpected
task was less pronounced (1,028 vs. 1,084 ms). In terms of
switch costs, these amounted to 119 ms with expected tasks and
were reduced to 60 ms with unexpected tasks. However, as can
be seen from Figure 1, this interaction was more pronounced
in the Guessing condition in which the switch cost reduction
by task unexpectedness was from 130 to 45 ms, whereas the
corresponding reduction in the Choosing condition was only
from 105 to 76 ms. Besides, the second-level interaction of CTI,
Task Transition, and Expectation turned out to be significant,
F(1,36) = 4.62, MSe = 4,860, p < 0.05. With a short CTI,
an unexpected task reduced switch costs from 166 to 72 ms
as compared to an expected task. This reduction was less
pronounced with a long CTI (72 vs. 47 ms).
The results of the corresponding analysis of ERs were
consistent with those of the RT analysis. A prolongation of
the CTI reduced mean ER from 7.4 to 5.3%, F(1,36) = 20.94,
MSe= 0.0017, p< 0.0001. Compared to a task repetition (5.4%),
ER was increased by a task switch to 7.3%, F(1,36) = 14.02,
MSe = 0.0019, p < 0.001. Expected tasks were associated
with a mean ER of 5.1%, which was increased to 7.6% in
case of an unexpected task, F(1,36) = 12.77, MSe = 0.0037,
p < 0.01. The cost associated with an unexpected task as
compared to an expected task was more pronounced with a short
(3.3%) as compared with a long (1.7%) CTI, F(1,36) = 5.02,
MSe = 0.0011, p < 0.05. The only effect involving the between-
participants factor Condition was the three-way interaction
FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction times (RT) and error rates (ER) as a function
of Condition, Expectation, and Task Transition. Error bars represent SEM.
with CTI and Expectation, F(1,36) = 4.31, MSe = 0.0011,
p < 0.05. This interaction was due to the fact that the
reduction of the costs associated with an unexpected task
by a prolongation of the CTI was exclusively observed in
the Choosing condition (5.3 vs. 2.1%), whereas these costs
were identical among the two CTIs in the Guessing condition
(1.3%).
Auxiliary Analysis
In order to check whether our main finding regarding the
modulation of the interaction of Task Transition and Expectation
by Condition may have been brought about by differences
in the frequencies of predicting a task repetition vs. switch,
we first explored whether such differences existed between
the Guessing and Choosing conditions. This was indeed the
case [t(36) = −2.96, p < 0.01]: whereas participants of the
Choosing condition chose task switches with a mean probability
0.75, the corresponding probability was 0.64 in the Guessing
condition. In order to test whether this difference in bias
could account for the observed differences with respect to the
interaction of Task Transition and Expectation, we subdivided
both groups by median splits based on each participant’s
relative frequency of predicting a task switch. In the Guessing
condition, participants below the median exhibited a mean
probability of predicting a task switch of 0.53, those above
the median of 0.76. In the Choosing condition, the respective
probabilities were 0.71 and 0.81. Most importantly, this did
not affect the observed differences between the two conditions
regarding the interaction of Task Transition an Expectation,
with all interactions involving the median-split based variable
Probability of Switch Prediction being far from significant
(all p’s > 0.15). Descriptively, in the Guessing condition
the switch cost reduction by task unexpectedness was from
152 to 54 ms for those participants with a probability of
predicting a task switch below the median, and from 113 to
34 ms for those participants with a probability of predicting
a task switch above the median. In the Choosing condition,
the switch cost reduction by task unexpectedness was from
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TABLE 1 | Mean reaction times (RT) as a function of Condition, Expectation, Task Transition, and CTI (SEM in parentheses).
Expected Unexpected M
Task repetition Task switch Task repetition Task switch
Guessing CTI 200 ms 958 (40) 1148 (38) 1158 (45) 1216 (49) 1120 (79)
Condition CTI 1000 ms 903 (39) 978 (40) 933 (52) 963 (45) 944 (82)
Choosing CTI 200 ms 919 (31) 1060 (33) 1130 (39) 1216 (42) 1081 (67)
Condition CTI 1000 ms 857 (33) 926 (34) 875 (45) 940 (38) 899 (70)
M 909 (34) 1028 (35) 1024 (43) 1084 (42)
100 to 82 ms for those participants with a probability of
predicting a task switch below the median, and from 113 to
64 ms for those participants with a probability of predicting a
task switch above the median. Thus, whereas there was some
trend in the Choosing condition for a stronger switch cost
reduction by task unexpectedness for those participants with
a probability of predicting a task switch above the median,
this difference was statistically not significant (p > 0.25). It is
also remarkable that in the Guessing condition, the reduction
of switch cost by task unexpectedness decreased from 98 to
79 ms with increasing probability of predicting a task switch,
whereas in the Choosing condition it increased from 18 to
49 ms. Furthermore, when one compares the two subgroups
with the most similar probability of predicting a task switch (i.e.,
those above the median in the Guessing Condition and those
below the median in the Choosing condition), the difference
regarding the task switch reduction by task unexpectedness
is even slightly more pronounced (79 vs. 18 ms) than the
one depicted in Figure 1 (85 vs. 29 ms). Therefore, we
safely conclude that differences in bias regarding predictions
of task repetitions and switches cannot account for this
effect.
DISCUSSION
One part of the present study, the Guessing condition, was
a conceptual replication of Experiment 2 of Kleinsorge and
Scheil (2015). The new experiment differed from the original
one mainly with respect to the fact that the determination of
the actual task was in part dependent on the guessing response
of the participant. This procedural variation did not result in
any substantial change in participants’ performance. It was still
observed that the presentation of an unexpected task hampered
the performance of task repetitions more than the performance
of task switches, which resulted in a reduction of switch costs with
unexpected as compared to expected tasks.
In contrast, in the newly designed Choosing condition task
(un)expectedness affected task repetitions and task switches
in a more even manner. This observation has two important
implications. First, it shows that the switch cost reduction
observed in the Guessing condition cannot be caused exclusively
by features of the task sequence or the interruption of this
sequence by an interpolated activation of another task in case
of a ‘wrong’ guess. In particular, it may be argued that the
impact of incorrect guesses on task repetitions may be due to
a disruption of repetition-based facilitation (cf. Kleinsorge and
Scheil, 2015, for an extensive discussion of this point). However,
such an account should apply likewise to the Guessing and
Choosing conditions. Besides, accounts in terms of disruption
of repetition-based facilitation had been already questioned
by an additional experiment (Experiment 3 of Kleinsorge
and Scheil, 2015) in which participants did not guess the
upcoming task but the position of a laterally presented precue.
In this case, incorrectly guessing the precue position reduced
switch costs almost exclusively by reducing the RT of task
switches.
The second implication relates to functional differences
between guessing and choosing under otherwise identical
conditions. As outlined in the introduction, there is almost
no empirical work comparing differences or commonalities
of guessing and choosing under otherwise strictly identical
conditions. The work of Bode et al. (2013) suggests that
both processes have a large functional overlap in neural
terms, although this was investigated with a widely different
task (perceptual discrimination). Nevertheless, our observations
corroborate the assumption of large functional overlap in
behavioral terms because we obtained only a very limited number
of significant interactions with the factor Condition. One of
these interactions, the interaction of Condition, Expectation, and
CTI, may be interpreted as indicating that participants of the
Choosing condition were initially somewhat more committed
to their choice than participants of the Guessing condition
were committed to their guess, a difference that was leveled off
with a long CTI. However, this interaction was only observed
in the ERs and not mirrored by a corresponding pattern
in RTs.
The second and certainly theoretically most important
interaction involving Condition was the interaction of Condition,
Expectation, and Task Transition (cf. Figure 1). In the
introduction, we considered that the truthful instruction
of the Choosing condition may provide participants with
a global model of the overall situation in terms of the
probabilities of granted and denied choices that were met
by what participants actually experienced in the course of
the experiment. Therefore, even an unexpected task, albeit
generating a mismatch on the local level of individual trials,
provided no challenge to this global model. In contrast, in
the Guessing condition, participants were told that the task
sequence would be random. Therefore, the only global model
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offered to participants alluded to a more or less diffuse notion
of ‘randomness.’ It does not seem that the deviation from
randomness that we introduced in the present experiment
affected participants in a systematic manner because we
observed essentially the same pattern of performance as in
Experiment 2 of Kleinsorge and Scheil (2015) in which the
task sequence was indeed (quasi-)random. Thus, there is no
indication that participants in the Guessing condition could
relate the frequencies of correct and incorrect guesses to expected
frequencies. Therefore, there were only mismatches on the
local level of individual trials but nothing to learn in relation
to the overall structure of the situation. Therefore, the only
option for the cognitive system to adapt to the mismatch of
expected and actual task was to enhance the activation of the
actual task, a process that facilitated task switches more than
repetitions.
The latter considerations are consistent with a predictive
coding perspective as outlined by Clark (2013). According to
this framework, the cognitive system, as a predictive device,
constantly predicts its own future states on lower levels of
a cognitive hierarchy. When these expectations are not met,
error signals are generated on the, respectively, lower levels
to which these predictions apply. These error signals induce
modifications of the predictions on the, respectively, higher
level that gave rise to the prediction error, thereby reducing
this error. The crucial difference between the Guessing and
Choosing conditions of the present experiment may consist of
the level of the hierarchy on which task-relevant predictions
are generated. In the Guessing condition, predictions (in the
rather abstract sense considered here) may apply only to the
level of tasks of an individual trial, with error signals generated
on this level serving to efficiently disambiguate the actual
task. In the Choosing condition, in contrast, a hierarchically
higher level representing relative probabilities across individual
trials may come into play. Because predictions generated on
this level should not be challenged by what is experienced, a
coherent representation of the situation is fostered which may
modulate the impact of prediction errors arising from lower
levels of the hierarchy. This, in turn, would deprive the system
of a stimulus for enhancing the level of controlled processing,
with the consequence of less switch cost reduction induced
by an unexpected task. Of course, this does not imply that
conflicts on the level of individual trials did not play any
role in the Choosing condition, but only that the impact of
such conflicts was dampened in comparison to the Guessing
condition.
At present, these considerations are admittedly rather
speculative. In addition, they are based on a framework that,
although intended to capture principles on all levels of a
cognitive hierarchy (cf. den Ouden et al., 2012), received
its empirical support mainly from studies investigating more
elementary features of neural processing (cf. Clark, 2013). The
major implication of the account delineated in the previous
paragraph is that the impact of error signals generated on a
certain level of the cognitive hierarchy should be modulated
by whether expectations concerning the present situation
are also generated on a hierarchically higher, more abstract
level.
Some support for these considerations comes from studies
investigating the effects of unexpected auditory stimuli on
different hierarchical levels. Todorovic and de Lange (2012)
dissociated the effects of repetition suppression, that is,
the reduction of neural activity by repeating a stimulus,
and expectation suppression, that is, the reduction of
neural activity by an expected stimulus. Neural activity was
measured by magnetoencephalography. Stimuli consisted of
pairs of tones, with the identity of the first tone predicting
the identity of the second tone with a probability of 0.75.
Expectation suppression was stronger when the first tone
validly predicted a non-repeated tone, compared to conditions
in which the first tone validly predicted a repetition of the
first tone. In other words, the effect of expectations on
a hierarchically lower level as indexed by the difference
in neural responses to repeated vs. alternated tones was
dampened when expectations on a higher level as induced
by the different transition probabilities were confirmed,
as compared to situations in which these expectations
were violated. Furthermore, Chennu et al. (2013) reported
evidence that evoked potentials assumed to reflect the
magnitude of prediction errors were reduced when instructions
induced participants to track the respective deviations in
order to report their number at the end of a block of
trials. These observations converge upon the notion that
validating prior expectations on a hierarchically higher level
dampens prediction error signaling on a hierarchically lower
level.
As already discussed in the Introduction, the Guessing and
Choosing conditions of the present experiment did not only
differ with respect to what participants were instructed to do (to
guess vs. to choose) but also with respect to the amount and
validity of information provided to them. This ambiguity was
put up with in order to create a situation in which an identical
proportion of (un)expected tasks could be implemented with
both instructions. While Guessing and Choosing instructions
surely impose different constraints regarding the proportion of
trials conforming to participants’ guesses or choices, this does
not mean that it would be impossible to independently vary the
proportion of expected tasks within each of these conditions –
albeit within certain limits that are surely different for both
instructions. Thus, it may be worthwhile to tear apart these
factors in future work.
Our findings may also bear some relevance with respect
to the distinction between cued and voluntary task switching
(cf. Arrington et al., 2014, for a review). As noted previously
(Kleinsorge and Scheil, 2015), the Guessing condition may
control and constrain processes of guessing the upcoming task
that may proceed spontaneously in the cued variant of the
task switching paradigm. The assumption that participants,
even when not asked to do so, may try to anticipate the next
task follows directly from the assumption that the brain is an
intrinsically predictive device. Our new Choosing condition,
on the other hand, approximates a voluntary task switching
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condition. Therefore, the procedure introduced in the present
paper may offer an alternative route for investigating functional
differences between cue-induced vs. self-generated expectations
(cf. Gaschler et al., 2014).
In sum, the present study adds support to the assumption
that errors in predicting an upcoming task result in an
adaptation that reduces switch costs (cf. Kleinsorge and Scheil,
2015). The observation that this process is modulated by
more abstract features of participants’ task representation adds
support to the assumption that the corresponding processes
are mediated top-down to support the exertion of cognitive
control.
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